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1 Introduction
Since Schumpeter’s seminal conjectures about the importance of technological ri-
valry and market power for the dynamics of innovation processes, the relationship
between market structure and innovative activity has attracted a great deal of
theoretical and empirical research. Modern game-theoretic models in the Industrial
Organization literature treat innovative competition as a dynamic stochastic pro-
cess. Firms are assumed to invest in R&D projects over time without being certain
whether, or when, the projects will be completed.
One of the most successful attempts of modeling the innovation process is the
game-theoretic innovation-race approach as originally introduced by Loury (1979),
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) and Lee and Wilde (1980). Especially the Lee and
Wilde model is heavily used as a basic concept for multi-dimensional extensions in
the Industrial Organization literature as well as as in macroeconomic analyses of
endogenous growth and trade. The model assumes that identical firms compete for
a given innovation that, due to perfect patent protection, only yields profits to the
first firm that introduces the new product or the new technology. While the winner
of the race takes all, the losers get nothing and therefore suffer a loss given by the
invested R&D expenditures which are cancelled as soon as the race is finished. As
Delbono and Denicolo (1991) have pointed out, the standard innovation race relies
on at least two inappropriate assumptions. Firstly, no firm participating in the race
realizes flow profits in the pre-innovation market. Secondly, since innovations are
considered as being drastic, the prize for the winner is not only exogenously given,
but also independent of the post-innovation number of firms in the market. For the
same reason, the losers cannot reap any profits which again implies that the number
of firms does not influence profits in the post-innovation market.
For empirical reasons, we follow Delbono and Denicolo (1991) in assuming that
firms realize flow profits during and after each innovtion race where, of course, the
profits of the winner will increase and the profits of the losers will decrease. Hence,
at any point in time, oligopoly profits will depend on the number of firms in the
relevant market. In their model with quantity-setting Cournot firms, Delbono and
Denicolo (1991) show that the essential result derived by Lee and Wilde (1980), that
an increase in the number of identical firms increases the Nash-equilibrium R&D
activity, does not generally hold anymore. Instead, they derive conditions under
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which R&D efforts will decrease with a rising number of firms. To a certain extent,
this theoretical ambiguity coincides which the empirical evidence on the relationship
between market power and innovative activity. As the empirical surveys by Baldwin
and Scott (1987), Cohen and Levin (1989) and Cohen (1995) show, the influence of
rivalry on innovative activity is, more than 60 years after Schumpeter’s conjectures,
still an open question.
The objective of this paper is to theoretically and empirically reexamine the in-
fluence of technological rivalry, market power, technological opportunities, demand
expectations and further possible explanation factors on the timing of innovations.
Using an available innovation data set at the firm level, we are able to provide
some new insights about the importance of these variables in explaining the dy-
namics of innovations. We therefore develop an empirically motivated version of
the standard innovation race model which departs from the Delbono and Denicolo
(1991) scenario in three important ways and, hence, yields some novel theoretical
results interesting in its own right. Firstly, we distinguish between the number of
rivals in the pre-innovation market and the number of technological rivals in the
innovation race. This distinction, which can be justified for example by financial
constraints of some firms, is appropriate since our survey data show that these two
variables usually do not coincide. Secondly, we prefer an oligopoly model of price
competition in heterogeneous markets since homogeneous markets are rarely found
in reality. This allows us thirdly to consider not only cost-reducing process innova-
tions, but also demand-stimulating product innovations both of which are included
in our data set.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present our basic
innovation-race model which is further specified in Section 3 to explain the expected
timing of innovations in terms of technological rivalry, market power, technologi-
cal opportunities and market size. In Section 4 we derive a tractable econometric
specification which can be estimated using qualitative-dependent-variable models.
A description of the data is given in Section 5. Section 6 presents the empirical
results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
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2 The Innovation-Race Model
Following the game-theoretic innovation-race approach as suggested by Delbono
and Denicolo (1991), we consider a given number of firms m, which compete for
a product or process innovation. The time at which a firm i’s research project is
completed is a random variable Ti which follows the exponential distribution
Fi(t) = 1− e−h(xi)t.
The hazard rate h(xi) = Ḟi(t)/(1− Fi(t)) defines the conditional probability of an
innovation success in the marginal time interval [t; t + dt] given that no success
occured until this time. The hazard rate is assumed to be an increasing function of
variable R&D expenditures xi. Even if Lee and Wilde (1980) originally allowed for
the possibility of initial increasing returns to R&D, the standard text book version
of the model assumes a global concave hazard function (see, e.g. Tirole 1988, Martin
1993). According to the specification of Delbono and Denicolo (1991), we specifiy




where µ represents the productivity of R&D activities reflecting the technological
opportunities in the considered market. The expected time of completion of the





−h(xi)tdt = 1/h(xi) = 0.5µ
−1x−0.5i . (2)
The greater a firm’s research effort, the sooner the expected time of completion.
In game-theoretic R&D models, research activities depend strategically on the ac-
tivities of their rivals. To keep the model tractable, we again follow Delbono and
Denicolo (1991) by assuming that all firms realize an equal pre-innovation profit
flow and that only one further innovation is considered. The expected discounted










hiπW /r + ĥiπL/r + π0 − xi
r + hi + ĥi
, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3)
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where π0 is the symmetric profit flow of all incumbent firms in the pre-innovation
market, πW is the post-innovation profit flow accruing forever to the winner of the
innovation race, πL is the corresponding post-innovation profit flow of the non-
participants and the losers, ĥi =
∑
j 6=i h(xj) is the instantaneous probability that
one of the (m − 1) rivals of firm i innovates and r is the constant interest rate.
Using the hazard function (1), the first-order conditions in the symmetric Nash-
equilibrium can be derived as
µ̃(2m− 1)x− [2µ̃2(m− 1)(πW − πL)− 1]x0.5 − µ̃(πW − π0) = 0 (4)
where µ̃ ≡ µ/r. Equation (4) determines the equilibrium R&D expenditures x∗ as
a function of the technological opportunities µ, the interest rate r, the intensity of
rivalry m, and the flow profits πL < π0 < πW . The term (πW−π0) measures the pure
”
profit incentive“, that is the incentive to invest in R&D in the absence of rivalry. The
term (πW−πL) reflects the ”competitive threat“ (Beath et al. 1989) in the innovation
race. Each firm has to recognize that, should it fail to innovate, one of its rivals will
succeed in realizing the innovation. In contrast to the Lee and Wilde (1980) model
where there are no pre-innovation profits and no post-innovation profits of the losers,
in the Delbono and Denicolo (1991) model, the presence of current profits and the
fact that even the losers make positive profits in the post-innovation equilibrium
induce firms to delay the expected date of innovation.
It can be shown that the symmetric equilibrium is unique and locally stable provi-
ded that ∂N/∂x < 0, N denoting the left-hand side of (4), whereby this stability
condition is generelly met for a wide class of hazard functions including the specifica-
tion in equation (1).1 Thus, by implicitly differentiating (4), we derive the following
unambiguous comparative static effects on the equilibrium R&D expenditures and,
taking (2) into account, the expected completion times of the innovations:
Hypothesis 1: An increase in the technological opportunities µ or a decrease in the
interest rate r will increase the equilibrium R&D effort and decrease the expected
innovation time of each firm (∂E[Ti]/∂µ̃ < 0).
Hypothesis 2: An increase in the intensity of innovation rivalry m will increase the
equilibrium R&D effort and decrease the expected innovation time of each firm
(∂E[Ti]/∂m < 0).
1 See Nti (1999).
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As long as π0, πW and πL do not depend on m, the derivatives of the competitive-
threat and the profit-incentive terms with respect to m are zero and the comparative
static market-structure effect is unambiguous. However, as Delbono and Denicolo
(1991) have pointed out, if these flow profits also depend on m, the impact of rivalry
on innovative efforts becomes ambiguous. To further analyze the model in this case,
they derive reduced form profit flows resulting from a Cournot oligopoly. In order
to develop an empirically tractable version of the innovation race model, we follow
their modeling strategy but depart from some crucial assumptions in three ways:
Firstly, we distinguish between the number of rivals n in the pre-innovation market
and the number of technological rivals m in the innovation race and assume m ≤ n.
This distinction can be justified for example by financial constraints which hinder
some of the competitors in the pre-innovation market from participating in the race
and is appropriate to fit the data which show that these two variables usually do not
coincide. Accordingly, the flow profits depend on n but not on m. Secondly, since
all firms in our survey data set operate in more or less heterogeneous markets, we
cannot deal with homogenous markets. Thus, we present an alternative oligopoly
model of price competition in heterogeneous markets which complements the Cour-
not model used by Delbono and Denicolo (1991). The extension to heterogeneous
markets allows us thirdly to consider not only cost-reducing process innovations
but also demand-stimulating product innovations both of which are included in our
data set.
3 An Illustrative Model of Price Competition
To analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game where m firms
compete in R&D in the first stage and n firms compete in prices in the second
stage, we have to derive reduced-form functions for the profit flows π0, πW and πL.
For reasons of simplicity and comparability, we assume linear demand functions
Di(p) = si− pi +(1/(n− 1))
∑
j pj, i, j = 1, ..., n, i 6= j, and constant marginal (and
average) production cost ci, leading to the flow profits




We start with the symmetric structure of the pre-innovation market, where ci = c
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and si = s which yields the reduced-form flow profits
π0 = s
2 (6)
where s is an indicator of the size of the market. Since we have data of product as
well as of process innovations, we consider two versions of the model. In the case of
product innovations, we assume that the winner’s demand parameter rises from s
to sW where ds ≡ sW − s represents the size of the product innovation. Since the
case of a drastic innovation is already covered in the standard patent race model,
we assume that the product innovation is non-drastic. This implies that the losers
as well as the non-participants of the race, while still facing the demand parameter
s, will remain active in the post-innovation market. As a result, the flow profits in
















In the case of process innovations, we assume that the winner of the innovation
race reduces its average cost from c to cW where dc ≡ c − cW represents the size
of the process innovation. Again, we concentrate on non-drastic innovations. In the















Since prices are strategic complements, a demand-stimulation product innovation
makes the winner soft, while a cost-reducing process innovation makes him tough.
In the first case all prices and profits increase, of course those of the winner more
than those of the rivals. Since ∂(πW − π0)/∂n < 0 and ∂(πW − πL)/∂n > 0, an
increasing number of competitors in the market lowers the profit incentive but
raises the competitive threat. In second case, the profits of the winner rise even
if its price is reduced, but prices and profits of the rivals decline. The derivatives
∂(πW − π0)/∂n > 0 and ∂(πW − πL)/∂n < 0 are of the opposite signs compared
to product innovations, so that an increasing number of competitors in the market
now raises the profit incentive but lowers the competitive threat. Thus, the profit
specifications in (7) and (8) enable us to additionally set up:
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Hypothesis 3: The impact of an increase in the number of firms n in the market
on the equilibrium R&D effort and the expected innovation time of each firm is
ambiguous (∂E[Ti]/∂n ≷ 0).
Implicitly differentiating (4) with respect to the market size s, making use of (7)
and (8) finally yields:
Hypothesis 4: An increase in the size of the market s will increase the equilibrium
R&D effort and decrease the expected innovation time of each firm (∂E[Ti]/∂s < 0).
If unobserved heterogeneities of firms are treated as random, the comparative statics
indicate that the probability of an expected product or process innovation within a
specific time interval from the present depends positively on the intensity of rivalry
m, technological opportunities µ and expected demand s, while the influence of
market power as measured by the inverse number of competitors n is ambiguous.
4 Econometric Specification
According to the presented model, each firm decides on the expected optimal inno-
vation time E[Ti]
∗ = 1/h(x∗i ). In our data set, these decisions cannot be observed
directly. Instead, we can only observe whether or not the firms intend to intro-
duce an innovation within the next two years, implying whether or not E[Ti]
∗ falls
into this given time interval. Therefore, we treat the optimal values of E[Ti]
∗ as








The structural equation for the latent variable is specified as
E[Ti]
∗ = β′yi + εi (10)
where the exogenous variables are summarized in the vector yi and the stochastic
error term εi is added to account for unobserved heterogeneities. For our econometric
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model this implies that a firm’s probability of introducing an innovation within this
given time period is a function of the explanatory variables µ, m, n, and s.
If we assume the error term ε to be independently and normally distributed we
obtain the conditional probabilities of the random variable TD given the exogenous
variables y:






where Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function. To identify the para-
meters the variance σ2 has to be restricted to unity. In addition, the threshold value
and the constant term need to be combined so that
P (TD = 1|y, β) = Φ(−β′y) . (12)
With the available observations from individual firms on TD and also on the re-
gressor variables y, we can formulate a likelihood function and maximize it with
respect to the parameter vector β. This is the standard probit model. As will be
noted in the next section, some of the regressors are ordinally scaled. We deal with
this problem in three different ways. Firstly, as is common practice in applied re-
search, we transform these variables into dummy variables implying that they can
be treated as nominally scaled variables. Secondly, we replace the ordinal coding
of y = 1, . . . , y = l by E(y∗|y = 1), . . . , E(y∗|y = l) as suggested by Terza (1987).
Thirdly, we follow an estimation procedure developed in Kukuk (2001) to account
for the ordinal scale of the regressors. All results are presented to demonstrate the
robustness of our results.
5 The Data
For our empirical analysis we use data from an innovation survey of German in-
dustrial firms. The survey was conducted by the Centre for European Economic
Research (ZEW), Mannheim, in cooperation with infas Sozialforschung, Bonn, in
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1994 and is part of the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) initiated by
Eurostat. For a detailed description of the survey refer to Janz et al. (2001). The CIS
frame questionnaire is closely related to the OECD recommendations for firm level
innovation surveys summarized in the OSLO Manual (1992). Following the OSLO
Manual recommendation, a postal survey was designed and the questionnaire was
sent out to approximately 11,500 firms in the German industrial sector stratified by
firm size groups and branches. On average, about 25% to 30% of the firms responded
which is comparable to other national CIS innovation surveys. For the 1994 wave a
sample of 3065 firms is obtained.
The approach is to ask at the firm level, for instance, whether or not a product
and/or a process innovation is planned to be introduced within the next two years.
Definitions for those types of innovations are given to help the respondents to clas-
sify themselves. In addition to these questions about innovative activities, each
panel wave had at least one block of varying topics. We use the second wave (1994)
conducted in 1995 since it is the only questionnaire asking for the number of com-
petitors in the firms relevant markets which we interpret as an inverse measure
of market power. The firms responded whether they had one to five competitors
(category 1), six to ten (category 2), or more than ten (category 3). The relative
frequencies of those categories in the sample are roughly about 25%, 25%, and 50%,
respectively. As a first attempt, we record bivariate and conditional frequencies of
market power and planned innovations in Table 1. The companies with less market
power (category 3) tend to plan to introduce an innovation less likely. In addition,
the firms were asked to appraise the intensity of technological rivalry for the future
on a five point Likert scale. Therefore, our available data set is extremely appro-
priate to empirically investigate the relationship between rivalry and the timing of
innovations.
6 Empirical Results
According to our theoretical model, we are interested in analyzing the effects of
innovation rivalry m, market power n, technological opportunities µ, and demand
expectations s on the planned timing E[T ] of product and process innovations.
Fortunately, the survey questions we use for our empirical work come close to the
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Table 1: Relative Frequencies of Market Power and Planned Innovations
Market Power Planned Innovations Sum
No Yes
category 1 6.52 18.47 24.99
[26.09] [73.91] [100]
category 2 6.52 19.09 25.61
[25.47] [74.53] [100]
category 3 18.47 30.93 49.40
[37.39] [62.61] [100]
Sum 31.51 68.49 100
Note: Relative frequencies in % are recorded. N=2929.
Conditional relative frequencies in brackets.
decisive variables in our innovation-race model.
As a first step, we explain planned innovations in Table 2 where we do not differen-
tiate between product and process innovations. Starting with the common practice
method, it can be seen that the third category has a negative parameter which is
only weakly significant reproducing the result of Table 1. The market power varia-
ble is measured by three categories in the data set. The first category serves as the
reference group. The parameter for the second group is smaller in absolute terms
than the parameter of the third category underlining the ordinal nature of this
variable and also the linear effect this variable has on the dependent variable. In
the second approach using the conditional expected value for the truncated latent
variable, the market power variable is still (weakly) significantly negative. Howe-
ver, in the indirect inference approach which is reported in the last column market
power is slightly positive but insignificant. This difference in estimates is due to
the above mentioned error-in-variables problem in the first two approaches. With
respect to technological rivalry, all three approaches find a strong positive effect on
the planned timing of innovations.
The current innovation status as a measure for technological opportunities is highly
significant and accounts for a large portion of the explanatory power of the esti-
mation. Flaig and Stadler (1994, 1998) interpreted it as the success breeds success
hypothesis. Compared to the services sector which is analyzed in Kukuk and Stad-
ler (2001) the technological opportunities have a stronger impact in the industrial
sector. There is also evidence for demand pull in all the different methods since the
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Table 2: Estimation results for Planned Product and/or Process Innovations
Explanatory variables Dummies Terza’s method Indirect inf.
Parameter Parameter Parameter
(t-value) (t-value)
C -0.7773 *** 0.33631 0.71980
(1.521) (2.525)
Log(numb. of empl.) 0.11337 *** 0.11427 0.02571
(5.302) (1.065)
Innovation in the past 1.38126 *** 0.84865 0.92436
(22.783) (22.151)
Expected demand -0.1107 0.12343 0.05559
0.15267 *** (3.829) (2.271)
Market power -0.02448 -0.05774 0.02487
-0.10226 * (-1.650) (0.638)
Intensity of rivalry -0.1065 0.11957 0.09741
0.2169 *** (3.703) (3.204)
East-Germany -0.1270 ** -0.13994 -0.13485
(-2.176) (-1.533)
Organizational Changes 0.2659 *** 0.24922 0.23930
(2.897) (3.039)
Part of a trust 0.0066 0.00499 0.00261
(0.073) (0.034)
Dummies for branches included but not reported
Number of observations 2775
Log-Likelihood -1211.7 -1208.9
R2V Z 0.485 0.486
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% , and 10% level in the
first approach. R2V Z denotes a pseudo coefficient of determination (Veall
and Zimmermann, 1996). In the dummies approach, reference groups are
category 1 for market power and the unchanged categories for rivalry and
expected demand, respectively.
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expected demand variable2 shows the correct sign significantly. Surprisingly, the
firm size measured by the (log of the) number of employees is not significant in the
indirect estimation. An explanation is that the current innovation status already
captures the firm size. Since we simulate the latent variable3 of the ordinal innova-
tion indicator, the log of the number of employees does not carry the appropriate
firm size information to explain more than the latent innovation variable.
The dummy variable for East-German firms is negative in all three approaches
indicating that even four years after reunification the technological opportunities
of those firms were lacking behind. We also controlled for organizational changes.
About 15% of firms had a major change in the firm structure. Our results indi-
cate that these changes have a positive effect on the planned innovations. We also
included dummy variables for 14 different branches accounting for sector specific
innovation behaviour, however to save space we suppressed the results.
In a next step we differentiate between product and process innovations and analyze
the determinants of the timing of their introduction. The results are recorded in
Table 3. The dummy variable approach usually obtains the same results as Terza’s
method and is therefore omitted in the table. For both types of innovation we yield
an insignificant positive effect of market power using the indirect inference. Terza’s
method reveals that the negative effect is larger for product innovations. The log
of number of employees is significant for process innovations whereas for product
innovations it is insignificant which drives the combined estimate of Table 2. All
the other results are similar in both innovation types. The variables for demand
and innovation rivalry used are both asking for expected changes in the future.
In the data set there are analogous questions with respect to past changes. We
also included them in another specification to determine their effects although our
model does not suggest their inclusion. With the exception of past demand having
a slightly negative effect on process innovation these variable are insignificant.
2 The variables for innovation rivalry and expected demand originally are measured with five cate-
gories, respectively. We summarize them into variables with three categories although estimation
results are very similar using the original variables.
3 Strongly monotonic transformations of the latent variable lead to the same ordinal observations
(Kukuk, 1994).
13
Table 3: Estimation results for Planned Innovations
Explanatory variables Terza’s method Indirect inference
Parameter t-value Parameter t-value
Dependent variable: Planned Process Innovation
C 0.12961 0.622 0.46451 2.352
Log(numb. of empl.) 0.13213 6.700 0.05814 2.602
Innovation in the past 0.71141 19.828 0.77625 14.335
Expected demand 0.11574 3.917 0.05400 2.297
Market power -0.04251 -1.330 0.02445 0.738
Intensity of rivalry 0.08898 2.968 0.07220 2.750
East-Germany -0.08698 -1.455 -0.07817 -1.195
Organizational changes 0.25674 3.370 0.25177 3.362
Part of a trust -0.06168 -1.001 -0.06505 -0.737
Dummies for branches included but not reported
Number of observations 2775
Log-Likelihood -1471.8
R2V Z 0.393
Dependent variable: Planned Product Innovation
C -0.33401 -1.662 0.04245 0.162
Log(numb. of empl.) 0.09716 4.690 0.01139 0.378
Innovation in the past 0.82102 22.467 0.89455 22.387
Expected demand 0.12055 3.863 0.05439 2.208
Market power -0.06248 -1.851 0.01734 0.483
Intensity of rivalry 0.11273 3.583 0.09504 3.155
East-Germany -0.13037 -2.079 -0.12477 -1.486
Organizational changes 0.24000 2.941 0.23198 2.483
Part of a trust 0.03169 0.487 0.02832 0.446
Dummies for branches included but not reported




7 Summary and Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to theoretically and empirically examine the influ-
ence of innovation rivalry, market power, technological opportunities and demand
expectations on the planned timing of innovations. Using an extended version of the
game theoretic innovation race model, we derived an estimation function where the
timing of innovations depends positively on innovation rivalry, demand expectations
and technological opportunities but where the influence of market power, measured
by the number of firms in the relevant market, is ambiguous.
The derived econometric specification is estimated using 2775 firms in the German
manufacturing sector. The empirical results, obtained with three conceptually diffe-
rent estimation procedures, show a significant positive effect of technological rivalry
on the timing of innovations as suggested by our theoretical model. Further, our
results confirm the technology push and the demand pull hypotheses since techno-
logical opportunities, measured by innovation successes in the past, and demand
expectations also show the predicted signs. The market power effect which is ambi-
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Futures – A Unifying Approach –, Juli 2000.
191. Woeckener, Bernd: Spatial Competition with an Outside Good: a Note, August 2000.
192. Woeckener, Bernd: Standards Wars, August 2000.
193. Opper, Sonja und Joachim Starbatty: Reflections on the Extension of Human Rights
from the Economic Perspective, September 2000.
194. Hornig, Stephan und Manfred Stadler: No Information Sharing in Oligopoly: The
Case of Price Competition with Cost Uncertainty, Oktober 2000.
195. Duijm, Bernhard: A First Evaluation of the Institutional Framework for European Mo-
netary Policy, Oktober 2000.
196. Edlund, Lena und Evelyn Korn: An Economic Theory of Prostitution, Oktober 2000.
197. Bayer, Stefan und Claudia Kemfert: Reaching National Kyoto-Targets in Germany
by Mainting a Sustainable Development, Oktober 2000.
198. Preusse, Heinz Gert: MERCOSUR – Another Failed Move Towards Regional Integra-
tion? November 2000.
199. Böckem, Sabine und Ulf Schiller: Contracting with Poor Agents, November 2000.
200. Schiller, Ulf: Decentralized Information Acquisition and the Internal Provision of Capital,
November 2000.
201. Leitner, Frank: Die Entstehung von Runs auf Banken unter verschiedenen Umweltbedin-
gungen, Dezember 2000.
202. Gampfer, Ralf: Die optimale Versteigerungsreihenfolge in sequentiellen Zweitpreisauktio-
nen bei Synergieeffekten, Dezember 2000.
203. Eisele, Florian, Werner Neus und Andreas Walter: Zinsswaps – Funktionsweise,
Bewertung und Diskussion, Januar 2001.
204. Jung, Robert und Andrew R. Tremayne: Testing Serial Dependence in Time Series
Models of Counts Against Some INARMA Alternatives, Januar 2001.
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